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Coming in the wake of turmoil in neighboring Iran, the bloody events in the province of Kahramanmaras in south? eastern Turkey have been presented to the American pub? lic as yet another instance of religious warfare in the Middle East. Under the title "Another Holy War Erupts in Turkey," a New York Times editorial (Dec. 31, 1978) asserted that Islamic politics, "obscured by modern politi? cal and economic rhetoric/' had erupted in violence "rooted in ancient religious emnity" between Sunni Muslims and Alevis, a branch of the Shi'i Muslim sect. But the Times dangerously misleads us to present the events in Kahra? manmaras as one more instance of a perennial "holy war." Behind the front of a holy war lies an all too secular and, destructive strategy mounted by the organized, extreme right in Turkey.
The events of Kahramanmaras were preceeded by polit? ical violence and mounting tension in neighboring prov? inces. The death toll in 1978 for the province of Kars to the northeast was 24; for Elazig to the east and Gaziantep to the south it was 60; for Diyarbakir it was 27; and for Sivas to the northwest it was 50. In April a similarly bloody con? frontation occured in Malatya when right-wing groups gathered at the funeral of a deputy of their National Move? ment Party attacked the headquarters of the local social democratic and left wing organizations, leaving 9 dead and 50 wounded. In 1978 there were 918 political assassinations in Turkey, compared with 37 in Italy and 97 in Spain.
For the last eighteen months the eastern provinces have been the targets of right-wing strategies, while militant left-wing organizations have often responded in kind to the terrorism, violence and murder perpetrated by the right. Historically the most impoverished area of the country, eastern Anatolia has a diverse religious and ethnic popula? tion. The largest minority ethnic group in the area is the Kurds, many of whom are Alevis. Ethnic Turks make up the majority of the population, and most of them are Sunni.
Religious and ethnic differences correspond significantly to class divisions. The Turkish Sunni population comprise the small producers, landlords, middlemen, and civil ser? vants; the Alevi Kurds are for the most part wage laborers, share croppers, or migrant agricultural workers.* *About two-thirds of Turkey's nearly two million Kurds are Sunni, and there are Alevi Turks. The Kahramanmaras area is unique for its concentration of Alevi Kurds.
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Traditional class differences are undergoing rapid transformation in this area. As the economic market expands from the big cities like Istanbul, Izmir and Adana to this hinterland, some of the traditionally privileged class of small producers, landowners, and middlemen are transformed into the local representatives and distributors of large commercial and industrial firms. Others are find?
ing themselves pushed into the proletariat in the wake of expanding commercial and industrial competition. Ex? treme right-wing groups have succeeded in channeling the economic and political disaffection of the Sunni population against the Ale vis. This sector of the population has also been the target in recent years of various advocates of "armed liberation strategies," ranging from vanguard peo?
ple's war to a separatist Kurdish national movement.
The extreme right-wing groups have exploited Sunni resentment and national chauvinist sentiments to create civil war conditions in the region. The Turkish and Euro?
pean press has documented that in Kahramanmaras rightwing mobsters, in some instances led by local heads of right-wing commando units known as Idealist Youth Organizations (UGD), attacked the crowd gathered at the funeral of two young leftist teachers who had been gunned down the night before by "unknown" assailants. When the rightists attempted to prevent the crowd from proceeding to the mosque and were not stopped by local security forces, they then marched into specific Alevi districts of Kahra? manmaras, where they murdered, looted, torched and plun? dered for two days before the army and security forces could restore order.
This was no simple eruption of "ancient religious hostil?
ity," but a highly organized political confrontation. The right-wing groups were heavily armed, in some cases with American-made M-l guns, also used by the Turkish army. The shops and residences of known rightist sympathisers were not harmed. Organized groups poured into Kahra? manmaras from neighboring cities and towns in bus Using its position as a junior partner in right-wing coali? tion cabinets both before and after the elections, NMP lead? ers shrewdly and methodically placed adherents in key posts throughout the civil service and armed forces. Since all civil servants have tenure, removing them from sensi? tive roles in the judiciary, police, customs and other depart? ments is difficult if not impossible.
Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit of the social-democratic National People's Republican Party did his best to clean house when he assumed power in January 1978. His first target was the upper ranks of the military. But when asked recently if the army and police were loyal to the govern? ment he replied candidly that the army now is, but the police are "infiltrated by political factions and divided."
Former military prosecutor and Supreme Court Justice Emin Deger has detailed collaboration between the Bozkurts and government counter-guerrilla units, and the close ties of the latter with the Central Intelligence Agency of the US. He cites the advice from the CIA handbook used by the Turkish armed forces: anti-subversion units must be prepared "to lead actions which can arouse popular suspicions that they are the work of revolutionaries. To achieve this one should not even refrain from engaging in acts of humanity."
?Various right-wing commando groups were organized nationally in the late 1960s and early 1970s and entrenched themselves during the coalition governments headed by the right-wing Justice Party. This party promotes the growth of a capitalist Turkey under the hegemony of the Western industrialized countries. The National Salvation Party advocates an Islamic Turkey integrated into the larger Islamic world. Each party maintains its own units of "militants," but the others have been eclipsed by the violence and ruthlessness of the Bozkurts.
This strategy may be all to easy too implement at this point in Turkish history. Alienated from the working class, impatient for revolution, eager to retaliate against rightwing terror, middle-class students and intellectuals have spread themselves among 20 leftist factions. They offer a ready target for infiltration by provocateurs and a cover for rightist attacks on one another.
The events of May 1, 1977 illustrate this vulnerability all too well. Half a million persons gathered in Istanbul's Taksim Square for the largest May Day rally outside of the Communist countries. It signified the resurgence of the Turkish left following the martial law repression of the early 1970s, and specifically of the Turkish Communist Party, now based in the German Democratic Republic. The CP dominates some professional organizations, like the architects' and artists' unions, and may have an electoral base of a million votes. The May Day rally was organized by CP sympathisers and officially excluded Maoist groups. When Maoists attempted to join the demonstration from a side street, shots rang out. As shooting continued many demonstrators were trampled in the ensuing panic and ter? ror. The final casualty list was 37 dead and more than 90 wounded. Contrary to initial press reports blaming the shooting on the Maoists, investigations disclosed that snipers had opened fire from the roofs of surrounding build? ings, including the Justice and National Salvation Parties' headquarters. Political violence is only one of Turkey's problems. The national economy is nearly bankrupt, with much of the for? eign debt of more than $14 billion owed to private US and European banks. Long rows of shantytowns encircle the major cities. Housing migrants come from the countryside and half a million workers who have been sent home by West German firms cutting back on foreign labor. Unem? ployment is nearly 20 percent. Commercial and industrial entrepreneurs bemoan the near-paralysis in trade and pro? duction. Workers, civil servants, and others complain that rapid inflation, inequitable taxes, and the new wage con? trols are devouring their real income.
The severity of the economic crisis and the inability of the regime to cope with internal violence and external pres? sures has generated support among some sectors of the population for an authoritarian solution. The long-term strategy of the right goes beyond discrediting Ecevit's government to fomenting of civil war conditions. At a time when events in neighboring Iran have focused atten? tion on the "northern tier" of the Middle East, a right-wing junta in Turkey that promises stability may seem attrac? tive to Western strategists and policy-makers. At their recent Guadeloupe summit, the leaders of West Germany, France, Britain and the US spent much of their time dis? cussing ways to bolster this weakest link in the NATO alliance. Aside from an economic bailout, still being nego? tiated, their conclusions remain secret. The British ambas? sador recently provided a hint and caused a national uproar when he told a Rotary dinner in Ankara that Tur? key would do well to follow the "Brazilian example."?
